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COMMENT 
NOT BITING THE HAND THAT 
FEEDS YOU: 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS AND 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the public became aware of the accounting 
misstatements of many major public companies. 1 Instances 
such as the Enron and WorldCom debacles have eroded inves-
tor confidence.2 As a result, the financial markets have suf-
fered.3 Between its peak on March 24,2000, and December 31, 
2002, there was a $7.4 trillion loss in the market.4 Since public 
accounting firms are responsible for reasonably assuring the 
accuracy of financial statements, a recurring question is, 
"where were the auditors?" 
In explaining why some public accounting firms have not 
fulfilled their duty of assuring financial statement accuracy, 
critics have identified conflicts of interest among auditors as a 
central reason.5 There are two major types of conflicts of inter-
1 Two well-known examples are Enron and WorldCom. See Patricia A. McCoy, 
Realigning Auditors' Incentives, 35 CONN. L. REV. 989, 1005 (2003) (noting that by 
June, 2002, WorldCom revealed that it had overstated its cash flow by $3.9 billion), 
and HAROLD BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLF, EMERGING TRENDS IN SECURITIES LAw 
48 (2002-2003) (stating that according to estimates at the time of Enron's bankruptcy 
filing, it actually had debt of$13.5 to $27 billion). 
2 McCoy, e.g., supra note 1, at 989-90. 
3 McCoY, supra note 1, at 989-90. 
4 Id. (measuring the loss based on the Wilshire 5000 Total Market Index). 
5 See, e.g., S. REp. NO. 107-205, at 14-23 (2002). 
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est that public accounting firms face.6 They are external and 
inherent conflicts of interest.7 "External conflict of interest" 
refers to the practice of an accounting firm providing non-audit 
services to a client company concurrently with its audit ser-
vices.8 "Inherent conflict of interest" refers to the situation in 
which a public accounting firm is hired, paid, and retained by 
the public company it is auditing.9 Both categories create con-
flicts of interest because the financial dependence present cre-
ates incentives to compromise independent judgment in favor 
of the client company.10 These two categories are discussed in 
more detail later. 
Many professionals face conflicts of interest.tt The mere 
existence of conflicts of interest does not itself indicate that 
these professionals will compromise their duties.12 Most audi-
tors live up to their financial statement assurance obligation in 
spite of the conflicts of interest they face. 13 Some auditors, 
however, have knowingly failed to fulfill their obligations.14 
Given the impact financial misstatements have on the markets 
in the form of lost investor confidence, some action is re-
quired.15 
In an effort to restore investor confidence in the wake of 
several accounting scandals, including Enron and its auditor, 
Arthur Andersen, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(hereinafter "The Act") in 2002.16 The Act addresses a wide ar-
6 See id. at 14. 
7 See id. 
S See w. 
9 See w. 
10 See id. 
11 Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwacking the Ethical High Road: Conflicts of Interest in 
the Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 87,174 (2003). 
12Id. 
13 McCoY, supra note 1, at 989. 
14 Id. at 989-90. 
15 See supra note 2-4 and accompanying text. 
16 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, PuB. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S. C., 28 U.S.C., 29 U.S. C.). 
Enron was considered the seventh largest corporation in the United States based on its 
reported revenues, and up until it filed for bankruptcy in December 2001, it had re-
tained Arthur Andersen to be its auditor. United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 2002 
WL 464828 (S.D. Tex. Indictment Cr. No. CRH-02, Mar. 7, 2002). The Grand Jury 
indictment of Arthur Andersen states that on or about October 16, 2001, Enron issued 
a press release announcing a $618 million net loss for the third quarter of 2001, and 
the SEC opened an inquiry into Enron the next day. Id. at 1. Arthur Andersen was 
aware by this time of additional significant facts unknown to the public. Id. at 2. An 
approximately $1.2 billion reduction in shareholder equity disclosed on October 16, 
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ray of issues, but a significant portion of the Act focuses on en-
suring the independence of public accounting firms.17 This is 
an attempt to remove the conflicts of interest facing public ac-
counting firms. 
The Act, however, deals only with the external conflicts of 
interest problem. IS The Act essentially prohibits an accounting 
firm from performing most non-audit services, such as consult-
ing services, for a client it is also auditing.19 In its rush to deal 
with the growing accounting scandals, it is perhaps under-
standable that Congress addressed the external conflicts of in-
terest first, reserving for future deliberation whether and how 
to deal with the inherent conflicts of interest.2o The legislative 
history behind the Act makes it clear that Congress may take 
steps in the future to investigate and address the inherent con-
flicts of interest problem if the current legislation does not suf-
ficiently achieve the desired results.21 
2001, was necessitated by Arthur Andersen and Enron having previously improperly 
categorized hundreds of millions of dollars as an increase, rather than a decrease, to 
Enron shareholder equity. [d. The press release characterized numerous charges 
against income for the third quarter as "non-recurring" even though Arthur Andersen 
believed the company did not have a basis for the conclusion. [d. Indeed, Arthur An-
dersen advised against using that term and documented its objections internally in the 
event of litigation, but did not report its objections or otherwise take steps to cure the 
public statement. [d. Arthur Andersen had also been put on direct notice, by a current 
Enron and former Arthur Andersen employee, that possible fraud and other improprie-
ties were taking place at Enron. [d. 
By Friday, October 19, 2001, Enron alerted Arthur Andersen that the SEC had 
begun an inquiry. [d. at 3. The next morning, an emergency conference call among 
high-level Arthur Andersen management was convened, and it was decided that docu-
mentation that could assist Enron in responding to the SEC was to be assembled by 
the Arthur Andersen auditors. [d. On October 23, 2001, Arthur Andersen's Enron 
engagement team began a wholesale destruction of documents. [d. Arthur Andersen 
personnel were called to a meeting and instructed to immediately destroy documenta-
tion relating to Enron and to work overtime if necessary to accomplish the destruction. 
[d. 
Over the next few weeks, the shredder at the Arthur Andersen office at the 
Enron building was used virtually constantly, and trunks of documents were also sent 
to Arthur Andersen's main office to be shredded. [d. A systematic effort was also 
undertaken and carried out to purge the computer hard-drives and E-mail of Enron-
related files. [d. Enron-related documents were also ordered destroyed by personnel 
working on Enron audit matters in Portland, Oregon; Chicago, Illinois; and London, 
England. [d. 
17 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, see generally supra note 16. 
18 See id. 
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(j-l) (2002). 
20 S. REP. No. 107-205, at 14. 
21 See id. at 21. See also 15 U.S.C. § 7232 (2002). 
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If or when Congress decides to address the inherent con-
flicts of interest issue, what steps Congress may take is not 
entirely clear.22 One proposed solution is mandatory rotation 
every few years of the accounting firm performing the audit.23 
The Act directs the Comptroller General to study this proposal 
to determine its potential effects.24 A mandatory accounting 
firm rotation requirement would limit the closeness created by 
a long-term relationship between the accounting firm and the 
public corporation, and it would limit the incentive to compro-
mise disinterested independent judgment in an effort to retain 
a "perpetual" long-term client.25 
In addition to mandatory accounting-firm rotation, few 
other solutions have been offered.26 This Comment will discuss 
- as an alternative solution - creating a competitive bidding 
system overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(hereinafter "SEC"). Such a system would require a corpora-
tion to pay for auditing services.27 The SEC, not the audited 
corporation, however, would control the hiring and retention 
function. 28 This would limit the incentive for an accounting 
firm to compromise its disinterested independent judgment to 
be hired and retained by a client. 
Section I of this Comment will discuss the role and respon-
sibilities of public accounting firms and provide a brief back-
ground of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.29 Section II will explore the 
mandatory audit firm rotation and other proposals seeking to 
remedy the inherent conflicts of interest problem.30 Lastly, 
Section III proposes a competitive bidding system overseen by 
the SEC as a potential remedy for this problem.31 
22 s. REP. No. 107-205, at 14, 2l. 
231d. at 21. See also THE CONFERENCE BOARD, COMMISSION ON PuBLIC TRUST 
AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 39 (2003) [hereinafter 
COMMISSION), available at http://www. conference-
board.orglknowledge/governCommission.cfm. 
24 15 U.S.C. § 7232. 
25 COMMISSION, supra note 23, at 39. 
26 See infra at notes 159-68 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra at notes 161-71 and accompanying text. 
281d. 
29 See infra at notes 32-133 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra at notes 134-68 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra at notes 169-71 and accompanying text. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF A PuBLIC ACCOUNTANT? 
Federal securities laws mandate a public company to pre-
pare comprehensive financial statements certified by an inde-
pendent certified public accountant.32 In explaining why Con-
gress requires this certification, the Senate discussions state 
that: 
Prior to SEC legislation ... it was by no means unusual to en-
counter semi fraudulent distortions of corporate ac-
counts ... almost always for the purpose of making the results 
look better than they were, and it was generally associated 
with some scheme of stock-market manipulation in which the 
management was participating.33 
Michael Sutton, former chief accountant of the SEC, has 
explained the need for an independent audit: 
Fundamental to the decision by the Congress in 1933 to re-
quire an independent audit was a recognition that the integ-
rity of financial information provided to investors, and the 
public perception of the integrity, are critical to the effective-
ness and credibility of our capital markets. Thus, it is the in-
dependent auditor's objective "second look" at the issuer's fi-
nancial statements that gives investors confidence that those 
statements are reliable and provide a credible framework for 
investor decisions to buy or sell securities of public issuers. 
Both the fact and appearance of independence are necessary 
to maintain the confidence of the investing public.34 
An auditor's opinion serves to furnish investors with a 
critical assurance that rigorous examination is made of the fi-
nancial statements by an impartial and skilled professiona1.35 
Public accounting firms must reasonably assure investors that 
a public corporation's financial statements meet the Generally 
32 s. REp. No. 107-205, at 5-6 (stating that each of the federal securities laws -
the 1933, 1934, 1935, and 1949 Acts - requires comprehensive financial statements 
that must be prepared, in the words of the Securities Act of 1933, by "an independent 
public or certified accountant"). 
33 [d. 
34 SHAPmo, supra note 11, at 177. 
35 [d. 
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Accepted Accounting Principles (hereinafter "GAAP").36 GAAP 
are a set of both broad and specific guidelines for companies to 
follow when measuring and reporting the information in their 
financial statements and related notes.37 While it is the re-
sponsibility of the corporation's management to prepare the 
financial statements, it is the auditor's responsibility to inves-
tigate and evaluate these statements to determine if the fman-
cial statements accurately depict the true financial position of 
the corporation.3s Because it is impractical to audit all of the 
financial records of a corporation, public accounting firms use 
methods, such as statistical sampling, according to the Gener-
ally Accepted Auditing Standards (hereinafter "GAAS").39 
GAAS are a set of guidelines that auditors are to follow when 
performing an audit.40 Audit methods performed in accordance 
with the GAAS do not ensure the absolute accuracy of financial 
statementsY Their use, however, creates a reasonable likeli-
hood that material misstatements and fraud will be discov-
ered.42 
B. THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF PuBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS IS 
OWED TO THE PuBLIC TRUST 
One of the fundamental principles of fiduciary obligation is 
the duty of loyalty.43 This duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary 
to not be personally interested (referred to as being "disinter-
ested").44 The fiduciary is required to put the interests of those 
for whom the fiduciary acts or represents before the interests of 
the fiduciary or others.45 Although fiduciary obligations are 
present in numerous professions, public accounting firms are 
unique because their obligation to the public always trumps 
36 ALVIN A. ARENS & JAMES K LOEBBECKE, AUDITING AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
11 (8th ed. 2000). 
37 J. DAVID SPICER ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 9 (2d ed. 2001). 
38 See ARENS & LOEBBECKE, supra note 36, at 142-43. 
39 [d. at 143-44. 
40 [d. at 37. 
41 [d. at 142-43. 
42 [d. at 142. 
43 SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 92. 
44 [d. at 92-93. 
45 [d. 
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their obligations to their audit clients.46 The United States Su-
preme Court emphasizes in United States v. Arthur Young & 
Co., that the relationship between certified public accountants 
and their clients must be characterized by disinterestedness 
and absolute independence.47 The Court states, "by certifying 
the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's finan-
cial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsi-
bility transcending any employment relationship with the cli-
ent."48 The Court characterizes the function of the accounting 
firm as that of a "public watchdog" that requires complete fidel-
ity to the public trust.49 
This public trust responsibility may sometimes be highly 
burdensome, but it is certainly not without rewards.50 The 
Act's legislative history emphasizes that federal law requires a 
publicly-traded company to hire an independent accounting 
firm to perform an annual audit, essentially creating a shared 
public monopoly that does not exist for other kinds of profes-
sional services.51 This exclusive shared monopoly is a signifi-
cant private benefit to public accountants, but is conditional on 
the accountants' assuming a public duty and obligation. 52 
C. THE TRADITIONAL OVERSIGHT OF PuBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRMS 
Traditionally, the accounting profession has been overseen 
by a hodgepodge of state and federal agencies, as well as nu-
merous self-regulatory organizations.53 The SEC is the top 
regulatory organization in the United States.54 The SEC issues 
numerous accounting rules and interpretations that supple-
ment those issued by private self-regulatory organizations.55 
46 Many fiduciaries have obligations to the public that trump those to their cli-
ents. SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 174. Doctors report certain communicable diseases, 
psychotherapists and lawyers report clients likely to harm others, and therapists may 
institutionalize clients against their will. ld. But auditors are unique in that their 
public duties always trump their obligation to clients. ld. 
47 See generally United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984). 
48 ld. at 817. 
49 ld. at 818. 
so See S. REp. No. 107-205, at 14. 
511d. 
521d. 
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The SEC also brings civil, administrative, and criminal en-
forcement actions against accounting firms and accountants for 
violations of these rules.56 Historically, the SEC has acted as 
an overseer, deferring to various private self-regulatory organi-
zations such as the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants (hereinafter "AICPA").57 The AICPA would set ac-
counting standards, issue policy and practice guidelines, over-
see accounting firms, undertake mandatory peer review, de-
velop and enforce codes of professional conduct, and impose 
disciplinary sanctions. 58 
D. THE INHERENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PuBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS AND 
PuBLIC COMPANIES 
As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has 
clearly articulated that the fiduciary obligations of public ac-
counting firms reside exclusively with the public trust.59 In 
writing securities legislation, however, Congress created an 
inherent conflict of interest between public accounting firms 
and the public companies they audit.60 Public accounting firms 
represent the interests of the investing publicY They must be 
completely independent of the companies they audit, in fact 
and appearance.62 The securities laws, however, require that 
an accounting firm be hired, retained, and paid by the company 
being audited.63 The inherent conflict of interest is that the 
subject of the audit is the same entity upon which the account-
ing firm is financially dependent.64 To use the old cliche, the 
accounting firm faces the dilemma of whether to bite the hand 
that feeds it.65 
56 Id. 
57Id. 
58 Id. The AICPA, the largest professional organization of certified public ac-
countants, has been the primary self-regulatory organization. Id. However, the Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the stock exchanges, and the audit commit-
tees of the boards of directors of public corporations have also played a role. Id. 
59 Arthur Young & Co., see supra note 47, at 817-18. 
60 SHAPIRO, see supra note 11, at 177. 
61 Arthur Young & Co., see supra note 47, at 817-18. 
62 SHAPIRO, see supra note 11, at 177. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 179. 
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1. The Process of Hiring, Retaining, and Paying for an Audit 
Engagement 
During this relationship, the public company must first de-
cide which accounting firm to hire to perform its audit.66 In 
winning an audit engagement, accounting firms compete based 
on their reputation, fees, and expertise.67 For the large public 
corporations, reputation boils down primarily to "Big Four" 
status.68 In recent years, fees have become increasingly com-
petitive.69 Some accounting firms often offer their services at a 
loss in the initial years of the relationship in an attempt to ob-
tain a long term account.70 The problem is not that such mar-
ket tactics are unethical; rather, the incentive to retain the cli-
ent until the relationship has become profitable creates a con-
flict of interest.71 For instance, if an auditor issues an unfavor-
able opinion during the early years of the relationship, it risks 
losing the client even before the relationship has become prof-
itable.72 
Public accounting firms often specialize in certain indus-
tries.73 This expertise can lower the cost and increase the qual-
ity of the audit, especially in complex or highly specialized in-
dustries.74 An unfortunate side effect is that public accounting 
firms sometimes use this specialized expertise to devise "inno-
vative" accounting treatments for the client.75 
66 MCCOY, supra note 1, at 994. 
67 [d. 
66 [d. The "Big Four," are the four largest certified public accounting firms in the 
United States. ARENS & LoEBBECKE, supra note 36, at 25. Consolidation of firms has 
led to a decline in the number of large firms. [d. For example, the "Big Six" became 
the "Big Five" in 1998 with the merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand. 
[d. The "Big Five" then became the "Big Four" after the demise of Arthur Andersen. 
SHAPIRO, supra note 11 at 175 n.117. The current firms are PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, and KPMG. 
69 SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 180-81. 
70 [d. Fees have become increasingly competitive since the late 1970s when 
Congress began pushing for more competition in the public auditing arena. [d. At one 
time it was typical to bill junior auditors at a ratio of four times the cost of that em-
ployee. [d. Now it is common for this ratio to be less than two, and it is not uncommon 
for the ratio to fall below one when another firm is trying to "steal" the account. [d. 
71 See id. at 181. 
72 MCCoy, see supra note 1, at 995. 
73 [d. at 994. 
74 See id. 
75 [d. 
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After the accounting firm is hired and has conducted the 
audit, it must decide whether to issue an unqualified opinion.76 
If the accounting firm decides not to issue an unqualified opin-
ion, the client - aware of the negative implications to follow -
must decide whether to replace the accounting firm.77 This 
process is called "opinion shopping."78 The term "opinion shop-
ping" refers to the practice of replacing the current accounting 
firm to prevent the issuance of a negative opinion.79 The SEC 
has tried to discourage this practice by requiring corporations 
to disclose publicly when they have changed accounting firms 
performing the audit.80 This requirement is at best an ambigu-
ous red flag.81 Many legitimate factors besides "trying to escape 
from a truly independent auditor whose loyalty cannot be 
bought or extorted" can justify the decision.82 Furthermore, 
disclosing a change of auditor may be counter-productive.83 It 
only discloses the situations in which the auditor's disinterest-
76 See id. at 995. The opinions that may be issued are: Standard Unqualified; 
Unqualified with Explanatory Paragraph or Modified Wording; Qualified; or Adverse 
or Disclaimer. ARENS & LOEBBECKE, supra note 36, at 47. 
A Standard Unqualified opinion is issued when the following conditions are 
met: All statements - balance sheet, income statement, statement of retained earn-
ings, and statement of cash flows - are included in the financial statements; the gen-
eral auditing standards have been followed in all respects on the engagement; suffi-
cient evidence has been accumulated, and the auditor has conducted the engagement 
in a manner that enables him or her to conclude that the field work standards have . 
been met; the financial statements are presented in accordance with GAAP; and there 
are no circumstances requiring the addition of an explanatory paragraph or modifica-
tion in the wording of the opinion. Id. 
An Unqualified with Explanatory Paragraph or Modified Wording opinion is 
issued when a complete audit took place with satisfactory results and financial state-
ments are fairly presented, but the auditor believes that it is important or is required 
to provide additional information. Id. 
A Qualified opinion is issued when the auditor concludes that the overall fi-
nancial statements are fairly presented, but the scope of the audit has been materially 
restricted or GAAP were not followed in preparing the financial statements. Id. 
An Adverse or Disclaimer opinion is issued when the auditor concludes that 
the financial statements are not fairly presented (adverse), he or she is unable to form 
an opinion as to whether the financial statements are fairly presented (disclaimer), or 
he or she is not independent (disclaimer). Id. 
77 McCoY, supra note 1, at 995. 





83 See Id. 
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edness might have triumphed, leaving undisclosed those situa-
tions where the auditor caved to client pressures.84 
2. Conflicts of Interest of Individual Partners 
In addition to the inherent institutional conflicts of inter-
est discussed above, there are often personal conflicts of inter-
est for public accounting firm partners as well.85 This arises 
when the partner must choose whether to acquiesce to ques-
tionable or fraudulent accounting practices.86 In some quarters 
of the profession, there is a "lose-your-client-lose-your-job" phi-
losophy.87 In these firms, partners who lose clients are often 
fired for being "nonproductive."BS The partner must decide 
whether to fulfill his or her fiduciary obligation to the public 
trust, or risk his or her employment with the accounting firm.89 
E. EXTERNAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN PuBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS AND PuBLIC 
COMPANIES 
In an attempt to become more profitable, public accounting 
firms have, in recent years, began offering many non-audit ser-
vices to their clients.9o In 2000, audit services were contribut-
ing, on average, less than a third to firm revenues.91 Some 
firms were even using audits as a loss leader to sell their other 
services.92 The Arthur AndersenlEnron relationship epitomizes 
the financial dependence of an accounting firm on its client.93 
In the year before Enron's demise, Arthur Andersen had 
84 Id. 





90 S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 14. 
91 SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 18I. 
92 Id. A loss leader is the practice of using an unprofitable product to aid in the 
selling of profitable ones to the same customer. See id. Accounting firms would "sell" 
the audit services at a price less than the cost. See Id. But in conjunction with, or 
afterward, the accounting firm would sell the highly profitable non-audit services to 
these same clients. Id. 
93 See Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking 
the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725, 799 (2003). 
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earned $52 million in fees from their relationship.94 Many 
question providing non-audit services to the same public corpo-
ration that the public accounting firm is also auditing, since 
this creates additional external conflicts of interest.95 The more 
financially dependent an accounting firm becomes on its client, 
the greater the incentive to compromise its disinterested inde-
pendent judgment.96 
F. THE ACCOUNTING MISSTATEMENT REVELATIONS THAT 
BROUGHT THE ISSUE OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST TO THE 
FOREFRONT 
After the financial market began to fall from its late 1990 
record highs, the public discovered that the financial state-
ments of some public companies were not depicting their true 
financial position.97 Instead of making the GAAP-required full 
and adequate disclosures, some companies had carefully con-
structed financial statement footnotes in an apparent attempt 
to hide what probably should have been line items, or they 
simply left out information that should have been in the state-
ment's footnotes.98 Many of the techniques used by these public 
companies were not only aggressive, but unacceptable accord-
ing to GAAP standards.99 
On October 26, 2001, Enron announced that it would be 
taking a third quarter charge of $1.01 billion. 100 This an-
nouncement caught the attention of not only the financial 
community, but Congress and the general public as well.101 
Within two months of the announcement, Enron filed for Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy.102 Enron's $13.15 billion bankruptcy filing 
was the largest of its kind in United States history. lOa Enron 
had also disclosed that it would be restating prior financial 
94 [d. 
95 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 14. 
96 See id. 
97 Thomas Wardell, The Current State of Play Under the Sarbanes·Oxley Act of 
2002,28 N.C.J. INT'LL. & COM. REG. 935, 937 (2003). 
98 [d. 
99 [d. 
100 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 1, at 47-48. 
101 [d. 
102 [d. at 48. 
103 [d. Many bankers estimated the actual amount to be $27 billion because En-
ron failed to include its off-balance sheet debt. [d. 
12
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statements that failed to follow the GAAP standards. 104 This 
restatement would result in reductions of reported net income 
of approximately $96 million in 1997, $113 million in 1998, 
$250 million in 1999, and $132 million in 2000; increases of $17 
and $5 million for the first two quarters of 2001; and a reduc-
tion of $17 million for the third quarter of 2001.105 
Although news of other alarming financial reporting ir-
regularities preceded Enron's, none captured the same atten-
tion. 106 Investor confidence further deteriorated after a series of 
revelations about other corporate accounting irregularities, and 
it became apparent that Enron was only the tip of the ice-
berg. 107 The demise of the Arthur Andersen public accounting 
firm soon followed the Enron revelations. loa On March 7, 2002, 
the SEC obtained a grand jury indictment against Arthur An-
dersen for obstruction of justice in connection with its investi-
gation of Enron. 109 
Mistakes and fraud will sometimes go undetected by 
proper audit procedures yo It is hard to believe, however, that 
these procedural errors account for many of the recently dis-
covered financial misstatements. The Arthur Andersen inci-
dent supports the notion that some accounting firms were well 
aware of these mistakes and fraudulent accounting practices. 111 
G. CONGRESS REACTS By PASSING THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 
In response to the numerous accounting scandal revela-
tions, Congress rushed to investigate and enact legislation to 
prevent accounting misstatements from occurring in the fu-
ture. 112 A recurring issue raised was concern over accounting 
firm independence and conflicts of interest.113 Congress real-
104 [d. 
105 [d. 
106 [d. at 50. 
107 [d. 
108 [d. 
109 Arthur Andersen LLP, supra note 16. Less than nine months after its first 
disclosure that documents related to its audit of Enron had been improperly shredded, 
Arthur Andersen was out of the public accounting business, having lost all of its more 
than 1,200 public-company audit clients and most of its global network of 85,000 em-
ployees. SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 90. 
110 ARENS & LOEBBECKE, see supra note 36, at 143-44 
111 Arthur Anderson LLP, see generally supra note 16. 
112 BLOOMENTHAL, see supra note 1, at 64. 
113 See id. at 63-67. 
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ized that there is an inherent conflict by the mere fact that the 
auditor is paid by the same company it is independently audit-
ing. u4 Congress, however, felt the more immediate concern was 
that in the last 15 years, the rapid growth in non-audit services 
offered by the major accounting firms has further eroded the 
independence that the auditor must bring to the audit func-
tion.u5 
Both houses of Congress proposed legislation attempting to 
prevent material financial misstatements in the future. u6 The 
House version was the Oxley Bill, and the Senate version was 
the Sarbanes Bill.1l7 On June 25, 2002, after WorldCom con-
fessed its $3.8 billion accounting fraud, the fate for financial 
fraud reform legislation was sealed. us The Senate deleted the 
House version and used the language of the Sarbanes Bill.u9 
The Act was signed into law on July 30, 2002.120 
1. A Significant Part of tire Act's focus is on Auditor Inde-
pendence 
The Act covers a broad spectrum of investor confidence is-
sues. l2l The issue of auditor independence, however, is a cen-
terpiece of the legislation.122 This is because public accounting 
114 S. REP. No. 107-205, at 14. 
115 [d. 
116 BLOOMENTHAL, see supra note 1, at 64-66. 
117 [d. By March 8, 2002, there had been over 30 Enron inspired bills introduced 
in Congress. [d. at 64. The serious legislative process that eventually led to the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act did not begin until Representative Oxley introduced his bill to the 
House of Representatives on February 14, 2002. [d. The bill passed the House on 
April 24, 2002 by a vote of 334-90. [d. at 64-65. 
The Senate bill began as a draft bill in the Senate Banking Committee, chaired 
by Senator Sarbanes. [d. at 65. The Committee's action followed ten hearings on the 
accounting and investor protection issues raised by the revelations involving Enron 
and other public companies. [d. On June 18, 2002, the Senate Committee considered 
the "Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002," which 
was reported favorably by a vote of 17-4. [d. at 65-66. The Sarbanes Bill was passed 
by the Senate on July 15, 2002, by a vote of 97-0. [d. at 66. 
The Act was passed by the House of Representatives on July 25, 2002 by a vote 
of 423-3, and on the same day passed the Senate by a vote of 99-0. [d. at 67. The 
President signed it into law on July 30, 2002. [d. 
118 [d. at 66. 
119 [d. (The joint Conference Committee agreed to what was primarily the Senate 
version designated as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). 
120 [d. at 67. 
121 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, see supra note 16. 
122 [d. 
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firms are an essential part of investor confidence.123 Financial 
statement integrity rests on the independence of the audit.124 
As a result, the accounting profession is a main target of the 
Act's regulations. 125 
2. The Act Focuses on Limiting External Conflicts of Interest 
and Centralizing Regulation Rulemaking and Enforcement 
The Act takes several different approaches in an effort to 
increase the independence of public accounting firms perform-
ing an audit. First, the Act explicitly codifies eight non-audit 
services that a registered public accounting firm may no longer 
perform contemporaneously with its audit of a public com-
pany.126 Second, the Act creates a new agency to oversee the 
public accounting firms and enforce the Act.127 This agency is 
titled the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (here-
inafter "PCAOB").128 Essentially, the PCAOB's primary func-
tion is to assume the role previously assumed by the AICPA, 
and bring together various issues and responsibilities that 
have in the past been subject to what has been characterized as 
"a bewildering array of monitoring groups" under the auspices 
of the accounting profession.129 Third, the Act provides that if a 
123 William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes·Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus 
Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1023, 1024 (2003). 
124 S. REp. No. 107-205, at 14. 
125 BRATTON, supra note 123, at 1024. 
126 These eight non-audit services are: bookkeeping or other services related to the 
accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; financial information 
systems design; appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-
kind reports; actuarial services; internal audit outsourcing services; management func-
tions or human resources; broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking 
services; and legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1. 
A firm under the Act may perform non-audit services for an audit client other 
than those listed above, including tax services, only if approved in advance by the audit 
committee of the issuer. [d. 
127 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2002). 
126 The PCAOB is responsible to "oversee the audit of public companies that are 
subject to the securities laws, and related matters, in order to protect the interests of 
investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, 
and independent audit reports for companies the securities of which are sold to, and 
held by and for, public investors." [d. 
129 S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 4-5. The main responsibilities of the PCAOB are to: 
register public accounting firms; establish or adopt auditing, quality control, ethics, 
independence, and other standards relating to the preparation of audit reports; conduct 
inspections of registered public accounting firms; and conduct investigations and disci-
15
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company executive was employed by the accounting firm the 
previous year, and participated in any capacity in that com-
pany's audit, the accounting firm cannot provide its audit ser-
vices.13o 
In addition to the above-mentioned steps that the Act 
takes, public accounting firms are also required to regularly 
interface with the company's audit committee.131 The auditors 
now report to the audit committee instead of to management.132 
The accounting firm must inform the audit committee of those 
aspects of the audit that represent critical accounting policies, 
aggressive accounting positions, alternative treatments, and 
the substance of the audit findings. 133 
II. SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED TO REMEDY THE 
INHERENT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST PROBLEM 
A. MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION 
As previously mentioned, Congress may take steps neces-
sary to deal with the inherent conflicts of interest problem with 
the relationship between public accounting firms and public 
corporations.134 During the Senate hearings, various witnesses 
recommended mandatory audit firm rotation.135 In response, 
Congress authorized the Comptroller General of the General 
plinary proceedings, and impose appropriate sanctions where justified, upon registered 
public accounting firms and associated persons of such firms. [d. 
130 15 U.S.C. § 78(j·l). 
131 [d. 
132 WARDELL, see supra note 97 at 939. Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the board of 
directors of public companies have an audit committee, and that the audit committee 
be independent. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j-l). This means that a member of an audit committee 
of an issuer may not, other than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit com-
mittee, the board of directors, or any other board committee, do the following: accept 
any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer; or be an affiliated 
person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof. [d. 
133 15 U.S.C. § 78(j-1). 
134 S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2l. 
135 [d. at 20. Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt proposed "that consideration 
be given to requiring companies to change their audit firm ... every 5-7 years to ensure 
that fresh and skeptical eyes are always looking at the numbers." [d. John White-
head, former Co-Chairman, Goldman Sachs & Co., recommended requiring "term 
limits of 8-10 years." [d. And Lynn Turner, former SEC Chief Accountant, recom-
mended requiring "mandatory rotation (5-7 years)." [d. 
16
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Accounting Office to study and review potential effects of man-
datory audit rotation.13G 
1. The Arguments That Have Been Made in Favor of and 
Against Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation 
The Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and 
Private Enterprise (hereinafter "Commission") views that an 
audit firm rotation would provide a useful tool in building 
shareholder confidence in the integrity of the audit and of the 
company's financial statements.137 One benefit of audit firm 
rotation is that an incoming accounting firm would provide a 
fresh look at the company's finances, accounting practices, and 
the former firm's audit. 13s The Commission further states that 
mandatory audit firm rotation would reduce the financial in-
centives for audit firms to compromise their judgment on the 
borderline issues. 139 The audit engagement would no longer be 
perceived as permanent.140 The Commission states that in dis-
agreeing with management, auditors would no longer risk los-
ing a "perpetual" stream of revenues. 141 
The argument against mandatory audit firm rotation is 
that such a requirement would not improve the quality of au-
dits and, therefore, would not be in the public's best interest.142 
13G 15 U.S.C. § 7232. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1405 (7th ed. 1999) (defining 
General Accounting Office as "the federal agency that provides legal and accounting 
assistance to Congress, audits and investigates federal programs, and settles certain 
contract claims against the United States"). 
137 COMMISSION, supra note 23, at 39 (The Conference Board convened a 12-
member commission in June 2002 to address the causes of declining public and inves-
tor trust in companies, their leaders and America's capital markets. The members 
include prominent leaders from business, finance, public service, and academia. The 
Commission is co-chaired by Peter G. Paterson, Chairman of The Blackstone Group 
and Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; and John W. Snow, Chair-





142 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PuBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT OF 
POSITION REGARDING MANDATORY ROTATION OF AUDIT FIRMS OF PuBLICLY HELD 
COMPANIES, 2-3 (1992) [hereinafter, AICPA], available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/membersldiv/secps/lit/sopslI900.htm. See also generally UNITED 
STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: REQUIRED STUDY 
ON THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION (Nov. 2003) (coming 
to essentially the same conclusions as the AICPA), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsld04216.pdf. 
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For instance, such a requirement would dramatically increase 
the costs for firms, clients, and the public, and it would in-
crease the likelihood of poor audits by depriving auditors of 
their most valuable tool: experience with a client and the re-
sulting comprehensive knowledge of its business and opera-
tions.143 Groups that have studied the mandatory audit firm 
rotation conclude that the costs greatly outweigh the perceived 
benefits.144 Such studies have indicated that audit failures oc-
cur as much as three times as often when the audit firm is per-
forming its first or second audit of the company.145 Former SEC 
Chairman Manuel Cohen stated: 
In a study of cases of substandard performance by auditors, 
several of the problem cases were first- or second-year audits. 
While not conclusive, this indicates the higher peril associ-
ated with new audit clients. Once an auditor becomes well 
acquainted with the operations of a client, audit risks are re-
duced. If a relationship between audit failures and new cli-
ents does exist, rotation would increase the problem and be 
detrimental to users.146 
Furthermore, opponents of mandatory audit firm rotation 
argue that each time a rotation occurs, management will be 
faced with a disruptive, time-consuming, and expensive process 
by having to select a new accounting firm and familiarize it 
with the operations, procedures, systems, and industry envi-
ronment of the company.147 
2. A Comparative Analysis of Audit Quality Failures and Fi-
duciary Obligation Failures 
An important element critics of mandatory audit firm rota-
tion ignore is the cost associated with using an accounting firm 
that is compromising its judgment because of its lack of inde-
pendence. l48 These critics view the core benefits of mandatory 
audit firm rotation as being only a fresh look at the company's 
143 AICPA, supra note 142, at 2-3. 
144 [d. at 3. 
145 [d. 
146 [d. 
147 [d. at 4. 
148 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
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finances, accounting practices, and former firm's audit.149 They 
compare this against the costs of first- or second-year audit 
failures.1so If the only problem were the deficiency of audits, 
the costs of mandatory audit firm rotation would clearly out-
weigh the benefits. The core concern, however, is (or should be) 
the cumulative cost of audit firms failing to fulfill their fiduci-
ary duties.151 
As a result of public accounting firms' failure to fulfill their 
fiduciary duties, there is an erosion of public trust in the capi-
tal market.152 The indictment and conviction of Arthur Ander-
sen is evidence that many financial misstatements were not 
primarily the result of substandard or incomplete audits. 153 
Instead, they were the result of accounting firms knowingly 
compromising their independence and engaging in or acquiesc-
ing in questionable or outright fraudulent accounting practices 
in order to hang onto lucrative business relationships. 1M The 
cost of first- or second-year audit failures is certainly a signifi-
cant issue. The high cost on the capital market resulting from 
erosion of public trust, however, is arguably more important.1S5 
3. The Shortfalls of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation in 
Remedying Conflicts of Interest 
Mandatory audit firm rotation would remedy some of the 
conflict of interest problems that critics of the current system 
seek to eliminate.156 Most importantly, it would likely reduce 
the incentive for accounting firms to compromise their inde-
pendent judgment in the hope of continuing a profitable client 
relationship for an extended or indefinite period of time.157 
Mandatory audit firm rotation would not, however, eliminate 
an accounting firm's incentive to compromise its independent 
judgment in order to bring in and retain client relationships, 
even if the relationships last for only five to seven years.15S 
149 AICPA, supra note 142, at 3. 
150 [d. 
151 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
152 [d. 
153 Arthur Andersen LLP, see generally supra note 16. 
154 [d. 
155 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
156 S. REp. No. 107-205, at 21. 
157 COMMISSION, see supra note 23, at 39. 
158 Cf id. 
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B. FEDERALIZING THE PuBLIC ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 
While mandatory audit firm rotation may fall short of 
completely eliminating the inherent conflicts of interest that 
arise in an audit, some alternatives are either extreme or un-
workable. There has been a suggestion to federalize the public 
accounting profession.1s9 Few advocates, however, favor creat-
ing a new federal bureaucracy with public accountants becom-
ing federal employees. 1GO 
C. A COMPETITIVE BIDDING SYSTEM 
A competitive bidding system is one middle-ground solu-
tion proposed by the Commission.161 The Commission recom-
mends that the audit committees of public companies use a 
bidding process for selecting an accounting firm to conduct 
their audits.162 According to the Commission recommendation, 
every five to seven years, an audit committee should engage in 
a review process for the audit engagement.163 During this re-
view process, proposals from current and other qualified ac-
counting firms would be solicited and submitted.164 Despite the 
fact that the current accounting firm may be retained, the 
Commission views the competitive bidding process as impor-
tant.16S Such a process would emphasize to external auditors 
that they report to the audit committee, rather than to man-
agement.166 
One potential downfall of the competitive bidding system 
proposal is that the hiring and retention process would still be 
made by an arm of the company.167 Although now required by 
the Act to be independent, the audit committee's loyalty still 
essentially resides in its company. 1GB To truly remove the in-
herent conflicts of interest in the relationship between a public 
159 See Jim Peters, Panel 1: The Collapse of the Corporate Model, 52 AM. U. L. 
REv. 579, 591 (2003). 
160 [d. 






167 Cf id. 
168 [d. 
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accounting firm and a public company, the hiring and retention 
decisions must be removed from the audited company's control. 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION: A MANDATORY COMPETITIVE 
BIDDING SYSTEM, OVERSEEN BY THE SEC 
A mandatory competitive bidding system overseen by the 
SEC would eliminate the audited company's participation in 
the selection and retention of its auditor. Furthermore, such a 
system would keep auditing costs at reasonable levels. With 
the bidding process monitored by the SEC, the public company 
would provide detailed relevant information to the SEC con-
cerning matters such as size, type of business, and detailed in-
ternal controls descriptions. Such information would be re-
quired for accounting firms to make an accurate bid proposal. 
The SEC would then collect bids from accounting firms and 
award the contract. This process would be open to all qualified 
public accounting firms. The implication of stringent require-
ments would ensure that accounting firms competing for the 
business are qualified and meet the minimum requirements for 
quality auditing. 
After ensuring compliance with all the qualification and 
bidding requirements, the contract would be awarded to the 
lowest bidder. Basing an award solely on price is not without 
flaws. One problem is that it could lead to a decline in the 
quality of the audit. Ancillary steps would be required to en-
sure that audit quality be maintained at satisfactory levels. 
Many of these steps already exist in the regulatory system.169 
Penalties for audit-quality deficiencies are enforced through 
judgments, settlements, and fines paid to plaintiffs and gov-
ernment authorities. 170 These sanctions can be buttressed ei-
ther with the threat of losing the opportunity to compete in the 
next bid for the client's business, or even more broadly, in bids 
to perform work for other companies. This threat to future 
revenues would greatly reduce the incentive to perform incom-
plete audits, under-staff audits, or staff audits with cheaper, 
inexperienced auditors in a quest to lower costs. Any benefit 
derived from lowering the quality of the audit would be offset 
169 MCCoy, supra note 1, at 1002. 
170 [d. 
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by the risk of large financial costs to the accounting firm in the 
form of lost future business. Cost savings would be encouraged 
to come from strategic moves and technological and managerial 
innovations on the part of the accounting firms, rather than 
from cutting essential elements of the audit process that might 
compromise the quality of the audit. Another attractive aspect 
of a competitive bidding process is that the awarded contract 
would be for a fixed-term with no right to terminate without 
cause. This fixed-term requirement would be beneficial for two 
reasons. First, a fixed-term contract is important for calculat-
ing a bid price. The accounting firm would be able to calculate 
the cost savings that go along with repeat audits of the same 
client, structuring its pricing system accordingly without risk 
of being let go. This long-term relationship, without the risk of 
premature termination, would lessen the accounting firm's 
temptation to compromise its independent judgment during the 
early years. 
Second, a fixed-term contract would prevent the audited 
company from engaging in opinion shopping. Since an audited 
company would have no right to dismiss an accounting firm at 
will, the company would be forced to comply with the GAAP 
standards. A remedial procedure, however, would be required 
for companies that genuinely disagree with an auditor's opin-
ion, similar to an appeals process. Such a process would re-
quire the company to prove that the accounting firm was wrong 
in its assessment of the company's financial statements. An 
SEC review board could easily accomplish this procedure. 
Unlike the current disclosure requirements when a company 
changes audit firms, an SEC review board would be able to 
evaluate the evidence presented and determine if the company 
has a legitimate complaint. An SEC board would have the au-
thority to resolve the disagreement or sanction the company for 
bringing a frivolous complaint. 
A. SUCH COMPETITIVE BIDDING DOES POSE A RISK TO AUDIT 
QUALITY 
A potential disadvantage of a competitive bidding system 
is the possibility of lower profits for public accounting firms. It 
is questionable whether a substantial decline in profitability 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss2/4
2004] CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 347 
would occur, since the current market is already highly com-
petitive. l7l In the event of lowered profit margins, a possible 
result could be that the public accounting profession would be 
faced with the problem of not being able to attract some highly 
qualified auditors. This result may occur due to a reduction in 
the anticipated income from becoming a partner. To truly un-
derstand the actual impact on the public accounting profession, 
independent studies would have to be conducted to determine 
how many qualified persons might leave or choose not to enter 
the profession. While some qualified accountants would shift 
to the private sector for larger salaries, it seems unlikely that 
the public accounting industry would not be able to attract 
qualified persons to fill the void. 
B. Is THERE ENOUGH COMPETITION FOR A COMPETITIVE 
BIDDING SYSTEM? 
Another potential problem with implementing a competi-
tive bidding system is that in order for the bidding system to 
work properly, there must be a sufficient amount of competi-
tors. Currently, the majority of public corporations are audited 
by the Big Four, and it is questionable whether so few competi-
tors would create enough competition. Under a competitive 
bidding system, smaller qualified accounting firms might be 
able to enter the market, from which they have historically 
been excluded. Smaller firms could make strategic moves into 
the market through niche expertise or by concentrating on spe-
cific geographical areas. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because of the important role that public accounting firms 
play in ensuring investor confidence in the financial market, it 
is imperative that auditors meet their fiduciary duty to the 
public trust.172 Conflicts of interest create incentives for ac-
counting firms to compromise their independent judgment. 
While many auditors live up to their public trust duties, those 
171 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
172 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
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that have not, or do not, pose a significant risk to the financial 
markets. 173 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act addresses the external conflicts of 
interest that have become common in recent years. 174 The Act, 
however, does not deal with the inherent conflicts of interest 
present in the relationship between public accounting firms 
and public companies. To further the independence of public 
accounting firms, these inherent conflicts of interest may be 
addressed by Congress in the future. 175 A competitive bidding 
process overseen by the SEC would remove the inherent con-
flicts of interest that other proposals fail to eliminate. 
173 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
174 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, see supra note 16. 
175 S. REp. No. 107-205, at 2l. 
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